Production politics and migrant labour advocacy in Singapore by Bal, C.S.
 
 





This is the author’s final version of the work, as accepted for publication  
following peer review but without the publisher’s layout or pagination.  
The definitive version is available at 




Bal, C.S. (2014) Production politics and migrant labour 
advocacy in Singapore. Journal of Contemporary Asia,  












Copyright: © 2014 Journal of Contemporary Asia 
 






PRODUCTION POLITICS AND MIGRANT LABOUR ADVOCACY IN 
SINGAPORE 
 
CHARANPAL S. BAL 
 




ABSTRACT: Since 2005, NGO activism, calling for greater legal protection for contract 
migrant workers has been the most concerted challenge to Singapore’s migrant labour 
regime. Despite a severely restricted civil society space, migrant labour advocacy has 
delivered small but significant reforms to laws covering migrant labour. The existing 
literature on migrant labour advocacy focuses on the importance of civil society space in 
determining the outcomes of organised contention. In the Singapore context, the limitations 
of advocacy are emphasised and explained in terms of the illiberal nature of the People’s 
Action Party-state and the strategies deployed by non-governmental organisations. Such an 
approach is limited in its explanatory potential as it only states what political spaces are not 
available without examining how spaces for contention are created. In contrast, this paper 
identifies the production politics between migrant workers and their employers as crucial in 
influencing the extent to which spaces for non-governmental organisation contention can be 
carved out. Accordingly, this paper argues that forms of production politics leading to 
worker desertion from the workplace, rather than tactical accommodation, have provided 
non-governmental organisations with the impetus to push forward reform agendas within an 
authoritarian political environment. 
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The ability of low-waged contract migrant workers in Singapore to agitate for better working 
conditions is constrained by the tight labour control regime of the People’s Action Party 
(PAP)-state. The historical repression and co-option of the trade union movement and the 
enforcement of pro-business laws allow the party-state to discipline labour in the interest of a 
particular model of economic growth and the preservation of one-party rule (Rodan 1989; 
Vasil 1989; Deyo 1991; Hing 1997). Contract migrant workers are additionally subject to 
even more coercive regulations governing their employment. In particular, the work permit 
system severely restricts the occupational mobility of migrant workers and seeks to ensure 
they do not integrate within Singapore society. Above all, it ensures the deportability of 
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migrant workers, where the right to terminate employment and repatriate migrant workers – 
even forcibly – lies at the complete discretion of their employers. The vulnerability of these 
workers is further compounded by the fact that almost all migrant workers are in debt by the 
time they arrive in Singapore due to large recruitment fees commanded by labour-hire agents. 
A good proportion of these fees often end up in the hands of employers in the form of 
kickbacks for hiring (Al Jazeera English, August 19, 2009; TWC2 2012a; Ong, 2014, 447). 
As a result of these circumstances, contract migrant workers in the country are unable to 
muster a collective response to address the issues which they face at work such as low and 
unpaid wages, job insecurity, unreported workplace injuries, under-deployment, forceful 
repatriation and employer kickbacks for hiring and contract renewal. 
However, since 2005, nascent non-governmental organisation (NGO) activism, 
calling for greater legal protection for these workers, has sought to challenge the state’s 
migrant labour regime. Despite a severely restricted civil society space, migrant labour 
advocacy has delivered small but significant reforms to migrant labour laws and the way in 
which the PAP-state handles various migrant labour issues. For instance, between 2008 and 
2013, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) acted to prohibit, and eventually criminalise, 
employer kickbacks for hiring while changing its stance on the occupational immobility and 
forceful repatriation of migrant workers. Regulations requiring employers to pay daily-rated 
migrant workers basic wages for the days they were not deployed to work were also 
instituted. While there has been no fundamental change to the country’s migrant labour 
regime, these shifts are significant in that they signal state moves to offer migrant workers 
greater legal protection in employment. 
This paper seeks to explain the emergence of, and the gains and limitations of, 
advocacy on behalf of blue-collar contract migrant workers in Singapore. The broad 
contentious politics literature tends to emphasise the importance of civil society space or the 
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“political opportunity structure” as influential in determining outcomes of organised 
contention (Brockett 1991; Kriesi et al. 1992; Tarrow 1994; McAdam 1999). In the 
Singapore context, the literature which dominates analysis of migrant labour advocacy 
stresses the limitations of civil society activism (Lyons 2005, 2009; Piper 2005, 2006; Ford 
and Piper 2007). These limitations are often explained in terms of the illiberal or authoritarian 
nature of the PAP-state and the strategies deployed by NGO groups. Such approaches are 
limited in their explanatory potential as they cannot explain why NGO activism has prompted 
small-scale reforms within this authoritarian context. 
There is, therefore, a need to go beyond the given limitations of civil society space in 
Singapore to identify the social forces that produce contention and the circumstances under 
which political spaces for contention are simultaneously carved out and closed up by civil 
society and state actors respectively. By way of approach, the substantive form of migrant 
labour advocacy is first conceptualised as and situated within Jayasuriya and Rodan’s (2007) 
and Rodan’s (2013) framework for modes of political participation. In explaining why certain 
modes of participation have opened up for NGOs, I emphasise the salience of production 
politics or workplace struggles between workers and employers over the effort-reward 
bargain (Burawoy 1985; Cohen 1987; Hart 1991; Sargeson 1999). I argue that the form of 
these production politics crucially influence the extent to which political spaces of contention 
can be carved out. Using the case of male Bangladeshi migrant construction workers in the 
country, I demonstrate  that forms of production politics culminating in worker desertion 
from the workplace, rather than the otherwise prevalent form of tactical accommodation with 
employers, provide the impetus for NGOs to challenge the existing migrant labour regime. 
The translation of instances of desertion into a “critical mass” of case-work through the 




Beyond the Singapore case, this paper advances a conceptual framework for analysing 
the articulation between production politics and modes of political participation. By focusing 
on the interplay between the social conditions of contention and the political spaces available 
for contention, this framework provides a useful basis to interrogate emergent and variant 
challenges to guest worker regimes around the world. 
 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE IN SINGAPORE 
 
Within the broader social movement literature, the concept of “political opportunity 
structure” is often used to explain the success or failures of social movements (for example 
Kitschelt 1986; Schwenken 2005; Cammaerts 2012). The concept, which originates from 
theorists such as Brockett (1991), Kriesi and colleagues (1992), Tarrow (1994) and McAdam 
(1999), refers to exogenous factors that limit or empower collective actors. While particular 
components have been modified to accommodate new variables in empirical studies, the 
political opportunity structure generally comprises: how open or closed institutional 
arrangements of the state are; the political stability or coherence of elites; alliances with 
elites; and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1999, 27). 
In the context of Singapore, the political opportunity structure is particularly striking 
because it reveals a near-absolute lack of opportunity for NGOs to pursue their agendas. 
Elites, under the one-party state capitalist regime, are relatively stable and coherent. In the 
absence of a strong domestic bourgeoisie,  the “technocratic political elites” constitute the 
solitary political elite group (Rodan and Jayasuriya 2012, 186).1 NGOs are, thus, unable to 
forge alliances with other elites because none exist outside the relatively coherent one-party 
state. The relatively closed institutional arrangements of the PAP-state and its capacity and 
propensity for repression are also significant impediments to NGO activism. Laws, such as 
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the Societies Act, the Public Order Act, the Political Donations Act and the Trade Union 
Ordinance, among others, are used to inhibit political dissent and collective organising 
(Rodan 1989, 1996; Singaporeans For Democracy 2012). Political dissent has been 
suppressed through the use of draconian laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) or 
lawsuits against political opponents (Rodan 1989, 1993, 1996; Mauzy and Milne 2002; 
Singaporeans for Democracy 2012). In 1987, for instance, 22 Catholic and lay social workers 
from the Geylang Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers, who had been advocating for better 
employment conditions for migrant workers, were detained without trial for varying periods 
under the ISA for “threatening the state and national interests” (Rodan 1993, 92; Mauzy and 
Milne 2002, 130; Lyons 2005, 216). Furthermore, grassroots politics has been co-opted or 
incorporated under PAP party control to the extent that grassroots organisations now serve as 
the party’s policy mouthpieces and are exclusively used by the party for mass mobilisation 
and social surveillance (Tan 2003). Finally, the labour movement in Singapore has been 
repressed and then incorporated by the PAP under the party-controlled National Trades 
Union Congress (NTUC) umbrella (Rodan 1989; Deyo 1991; Hing 1997; Piper 2006, 365). 
These features of political authoritarianism have a profound impact on the civil 
society space for independent political expression in Singapore. This is to the extent that 
some have argued that what is found in Singapore is not labour activism but “labour 
inactivism” (Piper 2006, 360). In considering the factors that deny workers the freedom of 
association, together with the political powerlessness of migrant workers as constructed by 
state policies, it becomes almost impossible for migrant workers in Singapore to formally 
self-organise. As a result, what we witness are small groups of concerned citizens who 
attempt to organise themselves to take up the concerns of migrant workers and advocate on 
their behalf (Piper 2006, 370-1; Ford and Piper 2007, 74-75). 
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The recent literature on migrant labour advocacy in Singapore presents arguments that 
are somewhat similar to the broader social movement literature in that they explain the 
success or failure of advocacy by evaluating the means of contention (Lyons 2005, 2009; 
Piper 2005, 2006; Ford and Piper 2007; Yee and Lyons 2009; Elias 2010). They tend to argue 
that the impact of labour NGOs’ activities in Singapore has been “comparatively muted” in 
contrast to similar movements in Hong Kong where female migrant domestic workers have 
been active at the grassroots level in self-organising and staging demonstrations (Ford and 
Piper 2007, 75; Constable 2009; Hsia 2009). Similarly, the gains that Singaporean NGOs 
have made in terms of securing migrant rights are considered to be modest or limited. The 
literature tends to broadly explain these limitations in Singapore in terms of the limited civil 
society space available for these NGOs to do their work (Lyons 2005, 2009; Ford and Piper 
2007; Elias 2010. For instance, Lyons (2005, 251) points out that the Societies Act, under 
which NGOs are required to register, prohibits them from engaging in any “political activity” 
which effectively suppresses many of the more contentious activities of these NGOs. The 
argument that political space significantly restricts NGO advocacy is most vividly made by 
Lyons (2009, 94) when she states that, “opportunities for NGOs to advance their causes 
depend in large part on the extent to which their goals are congruent with the state’s own 
ideology and interest.” 
At the same time, the literature offers additional factors to explain the limitations of 
migrant labour advocacy, mostly focusing on the limitations of transnational networks with 
NGOs outside of Singapore and the approach or strategies of these groups. Scholars such as 
Lyons (2009) and Piper (2006) tend to emphasise that given the lack of civil society space in 
Singapore, transnational networks and alliances have the potential to shape the “landscape of 
migrant labour advocacy” by “circumventing the tight grips of governments” (Piper 2006, 
376). In other words, they argue that the formation of strong transnational links with global or 
7 
 
regional NGOs has the potential to reinvigorate the relatively stagnant state of civil society in 
Singapore. Lyons (2009, 109) claims that one of the reasons why migrant labour advocacy in 
Singapore remains limited is that “a transnational phenomenon” is treated by Singaporean 
NGOs as a “local issue to be solved at the national level.” She explains the lack of 
transnational “scaling up” in terms of the relative youth of the Humanitarian Organisation for 
Migration Economics (HOME) and Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2) and “an inherent 
conservatism that reflects the nature of civil-society/state interactions in Singapore” (Lyons 
2009, 109). Closely related to the latter point is the argument that the limitations of advocacy 
are also related to the specific strategies used by these NGOs. For instance, Lyons (2005, 
239-40) argues that through their advocacy, NGOs failed to challenge dominant state 
discourses on the civil society, class, gender and citizenship. She further argues that advocacy 
strategies (which largely relate to migrant domestic workers) tend to use discourses that 
reformulate labour rights into “productivity” and “health” issues as opposed to a discourse of 
universal human rights which can be regarded as “progressive” (Lyons 2009, 106-107).2 In 
short, factors such as the lack of transnational networks as well as the limited advocacy 
strategies of NGOs are also related to the limited nature of civil society space in Singapore. 
The literature demonstrates that the closed political opportunity structure and 
consequently, the limited nature of political space for contestation mean that independent 
migrant labour advocacy in Singapore is severely inhibited. However, this approach only 
offers an understanding of what political space is not available. There is also a need to 
explain what spaces do exist, how these spaces are created and the political nature of these 
spaces, especially in relation to the Singapore state. While focusing on the means of 
contention, the literature also pays little attention to the root causes of civil society activism. 
While a range of factors are presented to explain how activism is enhanced or impeded, they 
do not address the social conditions or political impetus that drives activism forward. In other 
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words, what are the dynamics underlying the extent and nature of civil society space? Finally, 
by focusing solely on the repressive nature of the political regime in Singapore, these works 
do not consider the various strategies for the containment of conflict that the PAP-state has 
used in recent times to enhance the durability of its rule (Rodan 2008). State responses to 
NGO contestation, not all of them repressive, need to be further examined for the way in 
which they limit or co-opt migrant labour advocacy. In essence, there is a need to draw 
connections between the social conditions behind NGO contention and the political 
constraints and opportunities surrounding this contention. 
 
MODES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
In order to draw this connection, Jayasuriya and Rodan’s (2007) and Rodan’s (2013) 
framework on different modes of political participation is used. A mode of participation 
refers to a set of institutional structures and ideologies that “shape the inclusion and exclusion 
of individuals and groups in the political process” (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007, 773-74). In 
other words, these different modes influence the form of political engagement between states 
and civil society actors by determining who can participate, and how, and whether 
participants can challenge policies or advance alternative views and ideologies. 
Jayasuriya and Rodan identify four sites of political participation differentiated 
according to their level of inclusion and sites of participation (Table 1). Sites of participation 
can be state-sponsored or autonomous from the state and the levels of inclusion may be 
restricted to individual actors or may include collective actors as well. Here, I focus on three 
of these modes. Civil society expression (collective and autonomous from the state) tends to 
be relatively limited in authoritarian regimes such as Singapore but nonetheless does exist, 
particularly in the form of women’s, environmental and migrant-labour advocacy groups 
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(Lyons and Gomez 2005). The significant point about these organisations is that they “have 
not pursued agendas to fundamentally transform the established political order” but are 
generally geared towards reform and the promotion and protection of various rights and 
collective goods. Under societal incorporation (collective and state-sponsored), civil society 
groups are deliberately selected by government for consultation over public policy issues. 
However, this engagement is not based on democratic principles such as representation or 
accountability, but is “guided by a technocratic conception of politics as problem solving” 
(Rodan 2013, 26). Finally, administrative incorporation (individual and state sponsored) 
involves state attempts to resolve or mitigate political conflicts by framing and managing 
these conflicts in technical and administrative terms, effectively depoliticising them (Rodan 
2013, 24-26). 
 
Table 1: The forms of migrant labour advocacy situated within the modes of political 
participation framework 
Level of Inclusion 
Sites of Participation 
State and trans-state sponsored Autonomous from state 
Individual Administrative 
Incorporation 
• Workers lodging claims 
within the formal 
complaints mechanisms at 




• Blogs which advocate 
for migrant worker 
rights, among others 
• Use of social media by 
individuals and NGO 
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 activists to highlight 
abuses and violations 




• Closed-door meetings and 
discussions with MOM 
• Lobbying case officers 
and department heads to 
apply existing laws or to 
make exceptions in favour 
of workers 
• Lobbying divisional 
directors and the Minister 
of State to improve 
enforcement and reform 
existing labour laws 
• “Problem solving” 
Civil Society Expression 
• Public education and 
awareness-raising of 
employment and welfare 
issues facing migrant 
workers 
• Publicly lobbying 
Ministers and the 
Ministry to reform 
existing labour laws 
through letters to the 
press/open letters and 
action-research reports 
• Reporting labour and 
human rights violations 
to global stakeholders 
such as UN Human 
Rights Commission and 
US Department of State 




These modes are ideal-types – in practice, their boundaries can be blurred and social 
actors may often operate in different sites or engage in various modes. Furthermore, state-
sponsored sites, and their associated modes, do not always turn out according to state 
agendas. As these modes can sometimes operate at the intersection of state-sponsored and 
autonomous sites, they can often turn into sites of contestation even though the parameters of 
contestation may be limited (Hutchison 2007, 854). The objective here is to situate the 
substantive form of NGO contestation within this schema and explain why it takes this 
specific form. By mapping out the substantive nature of advocacy within this framework, 
certain social forces or dynamics associated with the opportunities and constraints of migrant 
labour advocacy can be identified and analysed. 
 
THE SUBSTANTIVE FORM OF MIGRANT LABOUR ADVOCACY IN 
SINGAPORE 
 
While a host of faith-based, women’s rights, human rights and migrant labour rights 
organisations have been mentioned in the literature with regard to migrant labour advocacy in 
Singapore, this section will focus on the work of HOME and TWC2.3 Since 2005, these have 
been the only two organisations constantly and consistently advocating on behalf of migrant 
workers. 
HOME and TWC2 were both founded in 2004 and were initially largely focused on 
migrant domestic worker issues. TWC2 was formed out of an informal network of concerned 
individuals and representatives of local welfare organisations called “The Working 
Committee 2” which sought to address local attitudes and treatment of migrant domestic 
workers (Lyons 2005, 97). HOME, on the other hand, was founded by Bridget Tan, the 
former coordinator of the Archdiocesan Commission for the Pastoral Care of Migrants and 
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Itinerant People (the Catholic Church’s ministry for migrant workers in Singapore that still 
exists) (Lyons 2005, 100). Despite some differences in the past advocacy strategies and 
public rhetoric, both these NGOs are focused on two broad and related issues – the welfare of 
migrant workers and migrant labour rights.4 Broadly, both organisations seek to address these 
aims through the direct provision of welfare services and advocacy within both state-
sponsored and autonomous sites. 
Direct services have always been intimately connected to advocacy work. HOME 
runs two helpdesks – one for migrant domestic workers and another for blue-collar migrant 
workers (such as construction workers) – as well as two shelters, one for men and the other 
for women. TWC2 runs one helpdesk that is open to all migrant workers as well as a soup 
kitchen for migrant workers on special passes (that is, workers with outstanding claims or 
complaints against their employers). Both NGOs also operate emergency helplines. Besides 
providing migrant workers with food and shelter, these NGOs provide legal advice and 
assistance to workers in need through their helpdesk and helpline services. The most 
significant legal assistance provided to migrant workers comes in the form of assisting 
workers in lodging formal complaints or claims against their employers at the Ministry of 
Manpower. NGO staff assist workers by briefing them about their labour rights guaranteed by 
employment and migrant-labour laws; assisting them with documentation with regard to their 
claims (for example, filling up forms, advice on what types of evidence the Ministry requires 
such as medical certificates, salary slips, time cards, bank transaction records and so on); 
teaching and assisting workers on how to make claims/complaints; and engaging with 
Ministry officers over the expedition of these claims. 
Both NGOs have consistently lobbied the Ministry to reform migrant labour laws for 
greater legal protection for migrant workers and to be more attendant to the welfare of these 
workers. HOME has traditionally conducted its advocacy within state-sponsored channels, 
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such as through formal complaints mechanisms and closed-door meetings, while the bulk of 
TWC2’s advocacy work has been more publicly vocal and outside these channels (Lyons 
2005, 101). However, over the past few years, the forms of advocacy of these two NGOs 
have largely converged – HOME has increased its level of public advocacy outside state-
sponsored channels and TWC2 has increased its engagement with ministry officials. The 
NGOs have also started collaborating on advocacy issues. In May 2009, a coalition called 
Solidarity for Migrant Workers was formed comprising HOME, TWC2 and a small arts-
based NGO called Migrant Voices in order to consolidate resources for advocacy (Channel 
NewsAsia, May 24, 2009; The Straits Times, May 25, 2009). 
The substantive form of migrant labour advocacy within different sites of political 
participation is summarised in Table 1. While individualised political expressions are one of 
various modes of participation used by individuals and activists, they are often used to 
complement advocacy within the sites of societal incorporation and civil society expression. 
In this section I will only elaborate on the latter two forms. Societal incorporation will also be 
discussed in relation to administrative incorporation, where only workers participate but with 
the assistance of NGOs. 
 
Advocacy within State-sponsored Sites: Societal Incorporation 
 
NGO advocacy within state-sponsored sites tends to take two related forms – para-
bureaucratic interventions into complaints mechanisms and closed-door meetings with 
Ministry officials. In order to better appreciate the dynamics of these interventions and 
meetings, we need to understand how the formal complaints mechanisms within the Ministry 
work. When workers file formal complaints over wage issues or work injuries, the Ministry 
initiates a compulsory “conciliation” process where, instead of passing judgement on the 
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dispute, an officer attempts to facilitate a compromise between worker and employer. It is 
usually at the discretion of the case officer to refer the dispute for arbitration if and when 
conciliation fails to produce an amicable agreement. 
The conciliation and arbitration process is largely framed by the PAP’s ideological 
“tripartite” framework, which involves government, workers and employers working together 
to promote harmonious industrial relations. In effect, Singaporean “tripartism” is an 
extension of the PAP’s co-option and political control of collective labour as it determines 
which collective actors are able to participate in the resolution of industrial disputes. At a 
collective bargaining level, the “parties” are effectively the Ministry of Manpower, the PAP-
controlled union umbrella NTUC and the Singapore National Employers Federation. In the 
conciliation of individual employment disputes, only individual workers (who have lodged 
complaints), Ministry officers and individual employers are allowed to participate. NGOs, as 
“voluntary welfare organisations” registered under the Societies Act, are explicitly not 
allowed to participate in the conciliation process (Heng 2008, 3). Being prohibited from 
engaging in trade-union-like activities under the said act, they are disallowed from legally 
representing workers in their claims or to participate in collective bargaining. 
In spite of this, NGOs are still able to intervene into the complaints mechanism as 
welfare organisations. This can only happen when migrant worker complaints are formally 
referred to the Ministry by NGOs. These referrals can be done in person, where NGO staff or 
volunteers personally accompany the worker to make a complaint at the Ministry buildings. 
More often, however, these referrals come in the form of emails or letters, or through official 
complaints forms which are usually faxed to Ministry departments from NGO premises. The 
Ministry formally recognises that these NGOs are providing welfare assistance to 
complaining workers – legal assistance, shelter or food – and formally correspond with the 
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NGOs over these cases. Formal correspondence such as notices to attend conciliation 
meetings from the Ministry to workers is also often sent to NGO addresses. 
This formal recognition allows NGOs to make para-bureaucratic interventions into the 
conciliation process by corresponding with individual case officers and their department 
heads to call for more stringent adherence to labour laws during conciliation meetings. NGOs 
also “coach” and brief workers before these meetings so that workers are more aware of their 
employment rights and are able to assert themselves during these meetings (Interview, 
Jolovan Wham, April 3, 2013). When workers return from conciliation meetings, activists 
ring up or write to case officers to press for more favourable terms of settlement or ask 
officials to ensure that the conciliation process does not overtly undermine the interests of 
individual workers. As most of these issues involve the payment of medical-leave wages and 
incapacity compensation for work injury cases and salary disputes over unpaid wages and 
overtime, rest day and notice pay, NGOs argue that employers should not get away with 
settling disputes at terms that are less favourable to the worker than those provided for by 
existing labour laws. 
At other times, para-bureaucratic lobbying within the formal complaints channels 
involve NGOs asking case-officers and their department or division heads to make exceptions 
where relevant labour legislation does not exist to protect workers’ interests. A good example 
of this was during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008-09 when large groups of 
Bangladeshi construction and shipyard workers faced gross under-deployment and sought the 
assistance of HOME and TWC2. Under-deployment, while a major problem for daily-rated 
workers, does not usually contravene labour or migrant labour laws. While some affected 
workers had valid complaints of illegal deployment which could be taken up by Foreign 
Manpower Management Division officers, many other complaints lodged by NGOs were 
deemed by the Ministry to have “no case.” NGOs responded, among other ways, through 
16 
 
lobbying within the formal complaints channels for the Ministry to make an exception by 
allowing these workers to seek new employers without having to be repatriated so that they 
may be given an opportunity to cover their debts. This amounts to contesting occupational 
immobility. While an official Change-of-Employer (COE) is not allowed for shipyard 
workers and only allowed for construction workers under extremely stringent and 
complicated conditions, NGOs argued that an exception had to be made given the plight of 
these workers (The Online Citizen, January 15, 2009).5 While only formally recognised as 
welfare organisations, NGOs are able to make para-bureaucratic interventions into the 
complaints process and turn an administrative site of participation into a site of contestation. 
Closed-door meetings with department and division heads of the Ministry can be seen 
as a form of participation that extends from these para-bureaucratic interventions. At these 
meetings, which can be initiated by either party, NGO representatives follow up on earlier 
interventions by highlighting issues relating to existing labour laws and the way they are 
enforced in practice in relation to particular worker complaints. NGOs use this opportunity to 
lobby department and division heads to either recommend changes in regulations/legislation 
to their superiors or to directly modify the way existing laws are being applied in conciliation 
and arbitration. Ministry officials, on the other hand, use these meetings to reassert the 
bureaucratic status-quo by justifying why particular laws and administrative procedures – for 
example, the process of conciliation before arbitration – are necessary. Ministry officials also 
use these meetings for fact-finding as NGOs are often able to highlight a range of 
employment and legal issues facing migrant workers which the Ministry may not be 
sensitised to. This would allow officials to consider the extent to which these issues can be 
resolved and incorporated within their existing administrative framework. While these 
meetings were previously ad hoc and tended to centre on particular and immediate issues, 




Advocacy in Autonomous Sites 
 
Migrant labour advocacy outside state-sponsored sites tends to take three public 
forms: education and awareness campaigns; lobbying Ministry officials; and reporting human 
and labour rights violations to global stakeholders. I will elaborate on the latter two forms. 
NGOs publicly lobby the Ministry for labour reform through letters and comments to 
the state-controlled and independent internet press/media as well as through the occasional 
open letters to government ministries, statutory boards and even state-owned/state-linked 
companies such as the SMRT Corporation Ltd. HOME’s open letter to SMRT in the wake of 
a bus driver strike in 2012 and HOME and TWC2’s joint open letter to the National Wages 
Council calling for the statutory board to ensure “decent wages” for all migrant workers are 
the most recent examples (HOME and TWC2 2011; publichouse.sg, December 10, 2012). 
Public lobbying is also done through action research reports which are always 
launched with an open press conference. “Justice Delayed, Justice Denied,” prepared by 
HOME and TWC2 (2010) and released in 2010 and “The Exploitation of Migrant Chinese 
Construction Workers in Singapore,” prepared by HOME (2011), and released in 2011, are 
two recent examples of this. The employment conditions of migrant workers are highlighted 
and recommendations made to reform various aspects of migrant labour laws and the nature 
of enforcement. Public lobbying at the local level effectively attempts to create public 
awareness among citizens and residents of the suffering and problems faced by migrant 
workers, and places external local pressure on the Ministry to act on individual cases or 
reform migrant labour laws. 
NGOs also engage in the reporting of human and labour rights violations to global 
stakeholders such as the UN Council of Human Rights and the US Department of State. NGO 
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input has been a significant constituent of the US Department of State’s Trafficking in 
Persons country report on Singapore from 2009 to present. Between 2010 and 2012, NGOs 
have used this channel of reporting to highlight how issues of indebtedness among workers, 
illegal withholding of their wages and passports and the use of forceful repatriation indicate 
signs of trafficking and forced labour (US Department of State 2010, 2011, 2012). The 
Solidarity for Migrant Workers coalition (HOME, TWC2 and Migrant Voices) also makes 
joint submissions to the UN Council of Human Rights for Singapore’s Universal Periodic 
Review (UPR) (The Straits Times, September 30, 2010; TODAY, November 1, 2010). 
Singapore’s first UPR took place in May 2011. In their submissions, the migrant labour 
coalition highlighted a broad range of human rights issues concerning migrant workers 
including barriers to labour justice, forceful confinement and repatriation, barriers to the 
freedom of association of workers, and the occupational immobility and deportability of 
migrant workers. Recommendations covering the administration of labour justice, freedom of 
movement, conditions of work and right to social security were also made in the submission 
(Solidarity for Migrant Workers 2011). NGO reporting of rights violations is an attempt to 
put external pressure from global agencies on the Ministry to implement various reforms of 
migrant labour laws. 
 
NGO Demands and Recommendations 
 
NGOs tend to strategically use different discourses and rhetoric when advocating within 
separate sites of participation. Within state-sponsored sites the emphasis tends to be on the 
enforcement of existing laws and on the welfare of migrant workers. The emphasis tends to 
be on welfare in public outreach and on human and labour rights when reporting to external 
agencies. Despite this, their substantive demands and recommendations – all of which are 
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directed at the Singapore government – are largely consistent within all these sites. NGOs 
call for the reform of broad labour and migrant labour laws and the manner in which they are 
enforced in order to be more attendant to the welfare of migrant workers and offer them 
greater legal protection against a known range of employer practices such as unpaid wages, 
salary deductions and forceful repatriation. Some of their more significant demands include 
(The Online Citizen, January 15, 2009; HOME and TWC2 2010, 2011; HOME 2011; 
Solidarity for Migrant Workers 2011): 
 
1. Outlawing and prosecuting repatriation companies for wrongful confinement and 
forced repatriation of workers; 
2. Repealing all work permit regulations that give employers the unilateral right to 
cancel the work permit of workers; 
3. Liberalisation of the COE regulations to allow workers to change employers 
without having to be repatriated; 
4. Negotiating multilateral agreements with sending states to regulate recruitment 
practices; 
5. Abolishing the practice of blacklisting workers unless they are convicted of 
criminal offences; 
6. The enactment of minimum-wage laws to ensure that all workers, especially 
migrants, are remunerated fairly; 
7. Abolishing time-bars on Employment Act claims which prevent workers from 
making salary claims for periods beyond a year from the time of lodging the 
claim; and 
8. Stricter enforcement of existing labour laws – in particular the Employment Act 
and the Work Injury Compensation Act – to give workers more effective legal 
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protection against employer practices, including increasing penalties for not 
paying wages on time. 
 
The Limited Impact of Advocacy 
 
Through state-sponsored and autonomous sites of participation, NGO calls for regime reform 
in protecting the rights and welfare of migrant workers effectively challenge key aspects of 
the migrant labour regime such as migrant worker occupational immobility and deportability. 
Despite overt calls for regime reform, the Ministry has only made small tweaks to migrant 
labour laws while more general labour laws such as the Employment Act and the Work 
Injury Compensation Act have remained unchanged. Activists have described years of 
lobbying the Ministry as frustrating as they “keep saying the same things but to different civil 
servants each time” (Interview, Jolovan Wham, April 3, 2013). Yet, these modifications are 
significant because they reflect how the Ministry has changed its stance on particular issues 
facing migrant workers, and hence warrant some attention. 
While no punitive action has been taken against repatriation companies, the Ministry 
has made a significant shift in its position on these activities. In late 2011, several Ministry 
officials led by the Minister of State for Manpower, Tan Chuan Jin, visited three repatriation 
companies and issued them with warnings with regard to the treatment of workers during 
repatriation (Ministry of Manpower 2011b; The Straits Times, December 15, 2011). 
Employers were also publicly warned, in a press release by the Ministry, that action would be 
taken against anyone repatriating their migrant workers without a proper settlement of their 
wages (The Straits Times, December 15, 2011). While the impact of these warnings are 
debatable – NGOs were unhappy with the Ministry’s limited response – one of the 
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repatriation companies announced that it would be ceasing operations following the 
minister’s visit (The Straits Times, December 15, 2011). 
The Ministry also changed its formal positions on kickbacks. Before 2009, the 
Ministry often ignored or deflected allegations of kickbacks by migrant workers and NGOs, 
claiming that these were personal issues and, because recruitment fees were paid in sending 
states, this was outside of their jurisdiction (Interview, Jolovan Wham, April 3, 2013). In the 
wake of the GFC spill-out and faced with over 1,500 agitated under-deployed workers in debt 
and the ensuing NGO pressure, the Ministry soon prohibited kickbacks under work permit 
regulations (Ministry of Manpower 2008, 2011a). With the amendment of the Employment of 
Foreign Manpower Act (EFMA) in parliament, in 2012, kickbacks were soon criminalised. 
Employers who receive kickbacks are now liable for prosecution rather than just an 
administrative fine (Ministry of Manpower 2012a, 2012b). The Ministry also made it 
compulsory, under work permit regulations, for employers to pay basic wages to their 
migrant workers when not deployed (Ministry of Manpower 2011a). 
While the Ministry did not formally amend its COE framework, the under-deployed 
workers who had made complaints through the NGOs were given conditional permission to 
source new employers without having to face repatriation (Ong 2014, 457).6 More recently, 
in July 2013, the Ministry initiated moves towards reforming the COE framework by calling 
for public feedback to review “the circumstances under which foreign workers could be 
allowed to change employers” (Channel NewsAsia, July 22, 2013). The Ministry also started 
showing an interest in recruitment practices in sending countries even though no multilateral 
agreements were ever signed. In the wake of the GFC, internal research on recruitment 
practices in Bangladesh, China and India were initiated while Ministry delegations 
subsequently visited NGOs in Bangladesh (among other sending countries) to learn more 
about recruitment practices there (The Straits Times, December 18, 2012). 
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The final piece of evidence that proves the impact of NGO advocacy was that, in early 
2009, the PAP-controlled union umbrella, NTUC, set up a Government Organised 
Nongovernmental Organisation called the Migrant Workers Centre (MWC) headed by PAP 
Member of Parliament, Yeo Guat Kwang. Providing the same direct services as HOME and 
TWC2, the MWC assisted the Ministry through the provision of welfare and assistance for 
migrant workers without the pressure of independent advocacy (The Straits Times, January 
31, 2009, September 3, 2009). 
Despite all its limitations, migrant labour advocacy has made some impact, and this is 
evident in small amendments to migrant labour laws and the Ministry’s newfound attendance 
to issues of recruitment and forced repatriation. At the same time, there has been no 
fundamental change to the migrant labour regime – migrant workers still lack legal-political 
rights and do not have the ability to organise collectively while their occupational immobility 
and deportability are only somewhat mitigated by these small shifts. However, crucial 
questions remain. Why have state-sponsored sites, within an authoritarian regime, opened up 
in this particular manner which allows NGOs to combine autonomous campaigning with 
para-bureaucratic lobbying? And how do we explain the particular impact, or the lack 
thereof, that advocacy has had on the migrant labour regime? To answer these questions, I 
utilise the explanatory potential of production politics by linking their variable and contingent 
outcomes to the form of NGO contention and its impacts within an illiberal political regime. 
 
THE FORM AND OUTCOMES OF PRODUCTION POLITICS 
 
In order to examine the particular nature of production politics among Bangladeshi 
construction workers in Singapore, I conducted four months of participant observation in a 
medium-sized construction firm (with a labour force of 200 migrant workers, around a third 
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of whom were Bangladeshi nationals) in 2010. Between 2010 and 2012, I also conducted in-
depth interviews with 45 male Bangladeshi construction workers in the country and examined 
50 NGO case-reports detailing the work-related complaints of around 200 such workers. The 
findings from these sources revealed high incidences of work-related grievances among these 
workers over low earnings and the excessive physical demands of work. In particular, they 
expressed unhappiness over low and stagnant wage rates, being paid below-statutory rates for 
overtime work, having to pay kickbacks for hiring (through recruitment fees) and contract 
renewal, various salary deductions (both legal and illegal) made by their employers as well as 
the harsh nature of their jobs. These workers felt that their existing employment arrangements 
required too much physical effort while leaving them with too little monetary reward to 
realise any form of social mobility back home. 
Rather than agitate for better working conditions or submit to employer coercion, 
these workers dealt with their grievances through the tactical accommodation of employer 
control. Sargeson (2001, 54) understands such “tactics” as “the manner in which the less 
powerful, at critical points in time, put systems of knowledge and management into use in 
ways not intended by their makers, with a view to subversion or carving out a space which 
they can manoeuvre in.” In this context, tactical accommodation involves workers providing 
obedient and competent work to their work superiors in order to avoid conflict with the latter 
while informally renegotiating the effort reward bargain. Workers appeared to be starkly 
aware of their occupational immobility and deportability and were keen to avoid any form of 
confrontation with their employers or supervisors – a confrontation they believe they will 
surely lose to the detriment of their economic well-being. Rather, they responded to 
workplace authority by openly proving their competence and obedience to work superiors 
while soliciting wage increments or preferential deployments which would either improve 
rewards or lessen their work efforts respectively. Worker performances of obedience are also 
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supplemented by everyday forms of resistance such as simulation, slow-downs and informal 
output restrictions outside periods of direct supervision which serve to moderate the intensity 
of the daily work regime (Scott 1985). 
The prevalence of tactical accommodation among Bangladeshi migrant workers in the 
Singaporean construction site can be explained in terms of how the structural vulnerability of 
these workers is situated within the micro-level dynamics of production. The data revealed 
two significant aspects of the structure of control within the construction industry in 
Singapore which shapes the form of production politics: the dispersed geography of 
production; and the prevalence of autonomous supervisory arrangements. Construction 
workers are often deployed to work, sometimes at dispersed work sites, in small groups of 
two to seven. This tends to prevent a large concentration of workers at a given point of 
production for prolonged periods of time which undermines the collective agency of workers 
(Therborn 1983, 42; Hutchison 2004, 17). At the same time, workplace supervision tends to 
be autonomous and punctuated. Due to the relatively weak bureaucratic capacity of small-to-
medium-sized contractor firms which make up the bulk of the industry, workers are often 
deployed to complete work tasks without being constantly and directly supervised or under 
constant surveillance. While employers and supervisors do periodically supervise workers 
and ensure that tasks have been completed satisfactorily, many workers who were observed 
and interviewed found themselves with considerable leeway in regulating their physical 
efforts whilst following orders from above. 
These factors, coupled with structural forms of coercion, have two simultaneous 
effects. While workers are inhibited from consolidating their grievances and developing a 
collective response, the particular workplace arrangements allow them to informally 
renegotiate the terms of work while covertly regulating their work efforts. The data 
additionally revealed that employers tend to combine strategies of veiled intimidation such as 
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repatriation threats with individualised concessions at work (including small-scale wage 
increments, preferential deployments). In a context where labour as a collective force has 
been repressed and debt-laden migrant workers are deprived of many legal-political rights, 
these dynamics of production tend to close off spaces for agitation while opening up 
opportunities for informal negotiations. It is particularly telling that while employers have the 
ability to direct work through coercive intimidation, they do not ordinarily do so. This is 
because tactical accommodation, on the part of these workers, circumvents employer 
coercion while providing employers with what they need – actual work being done. 
At the same time, the data also revealed particular forms of workplace disputes – over 
increasing wage deductions and intensifying work regimes, under-deployment and the 
management of work injuries – which tend to undermine workers’ ability to tactically 
accommodate employer control. Disputes are different from grievances in the sense that 
while the latter involves perceived unfairness over working conditions, the former involves 
open disagreement over certain aspects of these conditions. When wages are unpaid over 
prolonged periods of time, workers find little point in demonstrating or feigning obedience to 
their employers. When wage deductions or work regimes are progressively intensified, the 
space workers have to tactically accommodate employer control is significantly narrowed. 
When an employer has insufficient or no jobs for his workers, the latter find it hard to obey 
orders to wait for work as they would have no other means of servicing the debts incurred to 
secure employment in Singapore. When work injuries are not reported to the Ministry or 
given due medical attention, the injured worker cannot bring himself to obey orders to return 
to work and often expects to be given access to work injury compensation. 
In such circumstances, which are neither routine nor exceptional, workers are unable 
to utilise tactical obedience to renegotiate working conditions or even to avoid open conflict 
with work superiors. Tactical accommodation does little or nothing at all to remedy 
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unbearable work and pay regimes, the absence of medical attention after work accidents, the 
firm’s shortage of jobs (and hence, wages), or unpaid wages. On the other hand, the political 
powerlessness of these workers and their exclusion from collective-bargaining platforms 
mean that they do not have access to, or have trouble accessing, formal means to resolve 
these issues. As such, affected workers feel compelled to contest these disputes. They do so 
in various individualised and collective forms – quiet pleas, verbal demands, written petitions 
and wildcat strikes. 
The slightest hint of disobedience inevitably unleashes the coercive capacity of their 
employers. They respond to worker demands with threats, violence and forceful repatriation. 
These responses often pose an immediate threat to workers’ economic and physical well-
being. Due to the weak intrinsic collective (class) strength of migrant workers in Singapore, 
agitation and overt acts of insubordination in the workplace are almost always destined to 
fail. In fear, despair and desperation, these workers desert the workplace or evade forceful 
repatriation in order to seek outside help for their predicament. Many of these workers end up 
connecting with HOME and TWC2 through these NGOs’ outreach programs or through 
workers’ own individual networks. At the NGOs, case-workers and volunteers translate 
worker grievances over work injuries, under-deployment and wages into formal complaints at 
the Ministry. By querying workers on their grievances, case-workers attempt to find out 
which particular labour laws or regulations have been breached by the employer. They then 
proceed to assist the worker to lodge relevant claims to the Ministry such as work injury 
claims, salary claims and complaints regarding the infringement of EFMA regulations. Case-
workers also assist workers by following up on their individual cases with the Ministry while 
providing affected workers with food and shelter. 
Instances of worker desertion are, thus, translated into legal-welfare assistance cases 
through the provision of NGO direct services. NGO challenges to the existing migrant labour 
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regime through para-bureaucratic lobbying, closed-door Ministry meetings and human/labour 
rights reporting are essentially driven by this critical mass of case-work. This critical mass 
also provides NGOs with opportunities to leverage the Ministry’s public image and loopholes 
in labour laws and enforcement to ensure advocacy has greater impact. NGO direct services, 
therefore, constitute a nexus where particular outcomes of production politics, such as worker 
desertion rather than tactical accommodation, are transformed into the basis of advocacy. 
 
THE CRITICAL MASS OF CASE-WORK 
 
While advocacy, particularly within state-sponsored sites, is primarily issue-based, it allows 
NGOs to relate these issues to the lack of legal protection for migrant workers which can 
often be detrimental to their mental and physiological well-being. These issues do not come 
out of nowhere, nor do they even emerge from the widespread grievances that workers have 
in the workplace (see Koo 2001). Rather, these issues are derived specifically from instances 
of desertion which, in turn, are created when the prevalent form of production politics – 
worker tactical accommodation – escalates into disputes, confrontation and violence. 
The ability of NGOs to lobby for the outlawing of repatriation companies, which are 
hired by employers for the forceful repatriation of their migrant workers, comes out of 
successful worker resistance against forced repatriation. Forced repatriation, or the threat of 
repatriation, is not usually used by employers to set workers to work, but rather as a strategy 
to resolve work-related disputes. NGO calls for the tightening of labour law enforcement is 
derived from overt conflict – rather than simply worker grievances – over issues like salary 
deductions in the workplace, many of which are illegal but regularly practiced. The huge 
waves of under-deployed and indebted workers during the GFC in 2008 allowed NGOs to 
make effective calls for the liberalisation of the COE framework, the repealing of employers’ 
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unilateral right to terminate work permits and multilateral agreements with sending states. 
Worker grievances alone, while widespread, do not provide the impetus for advocacy. The 
breakdown of tactical accommodation in the workplace, and subsequent worker desertion to 
NGOs, does. 
A crucial link between outcomes of desertion and advocacy is that many of the issues 
that lead to desertion, or surrounding the circumstances of desertion, involve violations of 
existing labour laws on the part of employers. The fact that work injuries have not been 
reported, wages not paid according to statutory standards, or that workers may have been 
deployed to work in industrial sectors outside those stipulated in their work permits allow 
NGOs to use welfare provisions to carve out spaces of advocacy within state-sponsored sites. 
For instance, NGOs are able to make strong – public and closed-door – demands for the 
Ministry to act against repatriation companies not simply because they violate human rights. 
The Ministry tends to ignore such clamour. Rather, the Ministry has been prompted to act 
when NGOs highlight that many cases of forced repatriation actually involve legally 
recognised labour disputes – such as over unpaid wages and work injury compensation – 
which gives workers the legal right to remain in the country to lodge cases through the formal 
complaints mechanisms. 
While the closed civil-society space in Singapore does not allow these NGOs much 
formal political leverage, the critical mass of case-work, created through the interface of 
worker desertion and NGO direct services, allows NGOs to leverage the government’s public 
image as well as loopholes in labour laws and enforcement. NGOs play on the government’s 
public image of being administratively competent and strictly adhering to the “rule of law.” 
Letters to the press and global reporting allow NGOs to publicly highlight government 
loopholes in enforcement and labour legislation. Used in tandem with advocacy within state-
sponsored sites, this creates pressure for the Ministry to accede to NGO demands or requests. 
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In an interview, HOME’s then executive director Jolovan Wham admitted that he still could 
not be sure if such an approach works, “but the more a case is publicised, [we have noticed] 
the more attention the Ministry pays to it, the more favourable the outcome [for the workers]” 
(interview, April 3, 2013). When these NGOs publicly highlight loopholes in labour 
legislation and its enforcement, the Ministry would prefer these issues to be hammered out in 
closed-door meetings rather than through the local and international media. They are hence 
keen to actively create closed-door channels of engagement with NGOs. 
Case-work also provides NGOs with opportunities to leverage international pressure 
against the Ministry. NGO submissions for the US Department of State Trafficking in 
Persons Reports (from 2009) as well as Singapore’s first Universal Periodic Review by the 
United Nations Human Rights Council are not only drawn from principled objections to 
various migrant worker laws (or the absence thereof) but also from the large numbers of 
assistance cases accumulated over the years. For the Trafficking in Persons Reports, NGOs 
frame issues of worker indebtedness, withholding of salaries and forceful repatriation as 
indications of forced labour and trafficking. The reports assert that the Singapore government 
has not done enough in terms of prosecution, prevention and protection. This potentially hurts 
the image of the government, especially when Singapore has been ranked in Tier 2 together 
with countries like Sri Lanka while smaller nations like Slovakia are ranked at Tier 1 (US 
Department of State 2010, 2011, 2012). Many of the small changes the Ministry has made to 
migrant labour regulation and enforcement can be partly explained by the pressure produced 
by NGO reporting, which is, in turn, driven by cases compiled from the provision of direct 
services. 
Another reason why the Ministry opens up channels of engagement is that NGO 
participation within state-sponsored sites – necessarily backed by case-work – proves to be 
expedient to the Ministry’s technocratic politics of “problem solving” (see Rodan 2013, 26). 
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Because NGOs work on the ground and are more approachable for workers, they are more 
attentive to isolated or widespread workplace disputes as well as what the Ministry terms 
“employer malpractice.” They are thus able, and keen, to highlight the widespread flouting of 
particular labour laws to the Ministry. Given the credibility of the PAP-government as 
competent and adhering to its “rule of law,” the Ministry would rather channel these issues 
through the complaints mechanisms or closed-door meetings rather than having them 
reported in the local and international press. In the wake of migrant labour unrest during the 
GFC, the Ministry used NGO information to gauge the extent of migrant worker under-
deployment. The Ministry also collaborated with NGOs on coordinating the movement of 
workers to lodge their complaints and assist investigations in small coordinated groups rather 
than en-masse. 
 
IN THE WAKE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, 2008-09 
 
The greater the spill-out from workplace disputes, the greater the impact of NGO advocacy. 
While the impact of migrant labour advocacy has always been limited – NGO staff and 
volunteers often bemoan the fact that the Ministry usually ignores their recommendations and 
demands – it is particularly telling that, as far as migrant non-domestic blue-collar workers 
are concerned, the greatest impact advocacy has had on the migrant labour regime was during 
the GFC from late 2008 to 2009. This period saw about 1,500 Bangladeshi construction and 
shipyard workers flee their companies amid gross under-deployment, unpaid wages and 
employer intimidation. While earlier NGO (mostly closed-door) advocacy on issues such as 
kickbacks and occupational immobility had previous gone unheeded by the Ministry, the 
GFC saw the latter change its positions on both these issues. Publicly and behind closed 
doors, NGOs called on the Ministry to: 
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1. Allow affected workers to change employers without being repatriated; 
2. Force employers to compensate workers for the remaining validity of their contracts 
in addition to full wages for the time they were in Singapore; 
3. Increase the penalties for failure to pay wages on time; 
4. Be more stringent in approving work permit applications; 
5. Work with sending countries to monitor recruitment channels; and 
6. Conduct “exit interviews” at immigration points to curb forceful repatriation (The 
Online Citizen, January 15, 2009). 
While the Ministry did not formally amend the COE system, it made a one-off 
concession to allow most of the affected workers to find new employers while remaining in 
Singapore. From July 2013, the Ministry publicly indicated its intention to revise the existing 
COE framework. The Ministry also immediately made it compulsory for employers to pay 
their migrant workers a basic day’s wages even when they are not deployed to work. This 
new rule – termed as “no-work pay” – was applied to the cases being investigated and 
expedited during the GFC and was soon formalised as part of the work permit regulations 
under the EFMA. Most significantly, the Ministry changed its stance towards kickbacks – 
from claiming to NGOs that it was a “private issue” to explicitly prohibiting it and 
subsequently criminalising it under EFMA. By prohibiting kickbacks, infringements would 
draw an administrative fine. Subsequently, kickbacks have been criminalised and violations 
draw prosecution. While these “concessions” were still somewhat limited, it remains one of 
the more significant gains made by migrant worker NGOs. In the absence of mass citizen 
support for the cause of migrant workers, it is significant that the NGO advocacy campaign 
during the GFC was driven or fuelled by the unprecedented number of workers who had fled 




BEYOND CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE: OTHER LIMITATIONS 
 
Given that case-work derived from instances of desertion provides the impetus for NGO 
contestation, the limitations of advocacy cannot be explained in terms of NGO strategies and 
civil society space alone. It also needs to be considered that other outcomes of production 
politics, which do not culminate in workers seeking NGO assistance, limit the thrust and 
scope of migrant labour advocacy. As far as Bangladeshi migrant workers are concerned, the 
prevalence of tactical accommodation with employers becomes a significant factor, 
particularly since workplace grievances appear widespread. The limitations on advocacy can 
therefore stem from the fact that dynamics of control within the workplace – not all of them 
coercive – prevent grievances from being politicised into contentious struggles which would, 
in turn, provide NGOs with opportunities to lobby for labour reform. 
This is a particularly salient consideration when some of the relatively weaker NGO 
demands over the years are taken into account. At least two years prior to the GFC, NGOs 
had been lobbying the Ministry to look into worker allegations of kickbacks and to liberalise 
the COE framework for work permit holders from various industry sectors. These calls were 
often plainly dismissed by the Ministry since the cases encountered mostly involved 
complaints made by individual workers and were few and far between. In fact, prior to 2008, 
NGOs often informed workers that they would not be able to assist them with claims of 
kickbacks. This was because the Ministry refused to formally recognise it as an employment 
issue (interview, Jolovan Wham, April 3, 2013). While many workers I interviewed were 
explicitly aggrieved over having to pay kickbacks, particularly for contract renewals, their 
grievances did not often escalate into open disputes. These workers were in a position to use 
tactical obedience to informally renegotiate the effort-reward bargain with their work 
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superiors. This allowed them some prospect of improving their individual working conditions 
while staving off employer threats of premature termination and forced repatriation. 
The turnaround on kickbacks and occupational immobility made by the Ministry in 
the wake of the GFC was largely due to the magnitude of under-deployed workers who were 
in no position to use tactical accommodation to protect their migration objectives. The fact 
that their employers hardly had any jobs for them meant that there was barely an effort-
reward nexus to speak off and there was little they could do to stave off impending 
repatriation. Confrontation with employers over kickbacks ensued when their labour agents 
revealed to them that the bulk of their hefty recruitment fees were paid directly to the 
employers. This saw an unprecedented number of migrant workers desert the workplace 
seeking outside assistance. What were previously weak NGO calls for the illegalisation of 
kickbacks and the liberalisation of the COE system became strong ones and forced the 
Ministry to respond. 
Likewise, it is worth considering that NGOs have called for the repeal of particular 
work permit conditions that they feel are prejudicial towards migrant rights such as those that 
prohibit a work permit holder from marrying in Singapore or engaging in “immoral and 
undesirable activities” and “breaking up Singaporean families” (Solidarity for Migrant 
Workers 2011). There has been little real contestation on the part of workers over these 
regulations largely because they rarely, if ever, manifest themselves within their concrete 
everyday life experiences or place stress on their migration objectives. There is little 
information on whether migrant workers have actually had their employment terminated and 
been repatriated on these grounds. The workers interviewed expressed little or no concern 
over such regulations. There is, thus, little political impetus for NGOs to make claims against 
these regulations even though they constitute an open and evident form of discrimination 
against migrant workers. 
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Worker desertion as an outcome of production politics is even more significant in 
driving migrant labour advocacy given that NGOs have struggled to collectively mobilise 
migrant workers to push for labour reform. While stringent and repressive laws restrict the 
freedom of workers to form independent unions and explicitly prohibit NGOs from engaging 
in trade-union-like activities, collective action on the part of migrant workers – assisted by or 
independent of NGOs – has nonetheless occurred in recent years. In mid-2012, HOME’s then 
executive director, Jolovan Wham, organised a large group of Chinese female factory 
workers at a local Panasonic factory by drawing up a petition against their employers 
demanding an increase in wages and a reduction in working hours (Asian Correspondent, 
August 21, 2012; publichouse.sg, August 30, 2012). In February 2012, over a hundred 
Bangladeshi construction workers staged a sit-in by a construction site in the eastern suburb 
of Tampines to protest unpaid wages (The Online Citizen, February 6, 2012; TWC2 2012b). 
In November the same year, a group of 171 Chinese bus drivers, employed by the state-
owned SMRT transport corporation, went on a two-day strike over pay-parity and 
accommodation issues (The Straits Times, November 26, 2012; Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, December 3, 2012). 
These episodes of direct collective action have yet to produce any tangible gains in 
terms of reforms to migrant labour laws or political space for civil society activism. Many of 
the striking bus drivers were forcefully deported by the government while five purported 
“ringleaders” were prosecuted and jailed (CNN, February 26, 2013). The construction 
workers sit-in at Tampines was contained by the police, without overt force, and the wage 
dispute swiftly resolved by Ministry officials in favour of the workers (TWC2 2012b). The 
Panasonic workers’ petition led to no improvements in working conditions (publichouse.sg, 
October 3, 2012). HOME was given a stern reprimand from the Ministry as Wham, who 
organised the workers, was forced to step down from his role as executive director (interview, 
35 
 
Jolovan Wham, April 3, 2013). On a more encouraging note, the SMRT Corporation 
announced a small increase in wages for all bus drivers and a revision to the company’s pay 
system in March 2013; just weeks after the last striking drivers had been sentenced 
(inSing.com, March 8, 2013). It is evident that authoritarian state-responses that collective 
actions bring about essentially close up channels of contestation. Individualised or collective 
instances of worker desertion to NGOs, on the other hand, tend to open up channels of 
advocacy. 
Within an illiberal political context which places huge restrictions on freedoms of 
expression and association, NGOs struggle to collectively mobilise migrant workers or even 
to mobilise mass citizen support for migrant workers. They need opportunities to legitimise 
their advocacy work, especially towards the state. It is the critical mass of case-work 
procured from their direct services that allows them to engage with both state and non-state 
stakeholders to exert pressure on the state to reform migrant labour laws. In this sense, 
particular outcomes of workplace struggles between migrant workers and their employers – 
such as desertion rather than the perpetuation of tactical accommodation – provide the 
driving force behind migrant labour advocacy in Singapore. The variant and contingent 
outcomes emanating from these production politics, therefore, demonstrate both the potential 
for and the limits to contention which the contentious politics literature does not examine. 
 
REFINING THE REGIME BY ADMINISTRATIVE MEANS 
 
While NGOs attempt to engage in independent lobbying within state-sponsored sites, the 
Ministry attempts to incorporate independent contention into the legal-administrative 
mechanisms of the state. Substantively, this is done by widening the scope of their labour 
complaints mechanisms by creating additional offences for employer practices like kickbacks 
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as well as enacting regulations covering no-work pay for under-deployed migrant workers. 
Such moves allow more workplace grievances and disputes to be dealt with within state-
sponsored sites of participation. This means that workplace disputes over under-deployment 
and kickbacks, for instance, can now be resolved administratively rather than through overt 
political contention within the workplace. 
For the same reason, the PAP-controlled NTUC set up the MWC in 2009 in order to 
address the welfare issues of migrant workers locked in dispute, without the pressure of 
independent advocacy. In 2012, the MWC was quick to step in to help defuse several 
publicised worksite disputes without publicly advocating for reforms to migrant labour laws. 
The MWC’s approach is evident from the manner in which it intervened in another 
construction worker sit-in in the northern suburb of Yishun in December 2012. The MWC 
stepped in to assist Ministry officials in resolving a pay dispute between four Chinese 
workers, 20 Indian workers and their employer (My Paper, December 19, 2012). Rather than 
publicly criticising the Ministry for previously ignoring the complaints of some of these 
workers – a fact later pointed out by HOME’s Jolovan Wham in an open letter to the Minister 
of State for Manpower (TWC2 2013) – MWC chairman, and PAP member of parliament, 
Yeo Guat Kwang praised the Ministry’s “swift response” to the dispute and reminded 
employers to adhere to Ministry regulations (Channel NewsAsia, December 19, 2012). In the 
wake of emerging labour unrest among the migrant labour force, the MWC is working with 
the Ministry to “educate” migrant workers on how to “settle any employment dispute 
amicably” (My Paper, December 19, 2012). 
The measures taken to legally require no-work pay and to criminalise kickbacks, as 
well as setting up the MWC, encourage workplace disputes to be resolved administratively at 
an individual level rather than through collective mobilisation. In effect, such measures to 
extend legal protection to migrant workers represent a “technocratic management and 
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resolution of political conflict” conflicts which originate from tensions within the production 
process. They complement, rather than free up, existing “tight controls on political 
expression” which “militate against” NGO attempts to collectively mobilise migrant workers 
or mass citizen support for their causes (Rodan and Jayasuriya 2007, 796). While recent 
reforms to the migrant labour regime have delivered greater legal protection for migrant 
workers, they also need to be understood for the manner in which they depoliticise the 
workplace grievances of migrant workers while attempting to administratively incorporate 




In calling for reform to migrant labour laws within both state-sponsored and autonomous 
sites of participation, NGO advocacy presents a challenge to the existing migrant labour 
regime in Singapore. While this regime has not been fundamentally transformed, some small 
but significant changes have occurred in terms of migrant labour legislation and the 
Manpower Ministry’s stance towards the issues facing migrant workers. The existing 
contentious politics literature, with its focus on the restricted civil society space in Singapore, 
does not explain why NGO contention and subsequent reforms were made possible. In 
contrast, I argue that the form and outcomes of production politics between migrant workers 
and their employers have a significant influence on the extent to which NGOs can carve out 
political spaces to lobby for reform. 
Using the case of Bangladeshi migrant construction workers, I demonstrate that the 
political impetus behind NGO contention comes from overtly confrontational outcomes of 
workplace struggles such as worker desertion, rather than the perpetuation of tactical 
accommodation. Instances of desertion are translated into a critical mass of case-work 
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through the nexus of NGO direct services. This case-work forms the primary basis of 
advocacy within various political sites, without which advocacy cannot be conducted 
effectively. Within the context of an illiberal political environment where NGOs find it 
difficult to collectively mobilise migrant workers or mass citizen support, contentious 
outcomes of production politics, such as desertion, allow NGOs to legitimise their advocacy 
work and exert pressure on the state to reform migrant labour laws. While NGO advocacy, 
driven by the breakdown of tactical accommodation in the workplace, continues to carve out 
spaces of contention, the state attempts to administratively incorporate it through small-scale 
reforms while containing and suppressing any forms of migrant worker collective action. 
Beyond Singapore, this study offers a conceptual framework for analysing the 
articulation between production politics and modes of political participation. Challenges to 
contract migrant labour regimes in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and East Asia have taken 
different forms and yield significantly different outcomes From the anti-globalisation 
demonstrations by migrant worker coalitions in Hong Kong, to the wildcat strikes of 
construction workers over wage demands in Dubai, various episodes of migrant worker 
contestation can be framed as being underpinned by particular forms of production politics 
which drive claim-making forward. These are in addition to historically contingent modes of 
political participation that allow for different forms of collective action. The interplay 
between the two is crucial as it shapes the nature of political opportunities and civil society 
space available to migrant workers and activists. The framework presented here can, 
therefore, be used elsewhere to understand the extent to which advocacy groups are able to 
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1 Rodan and Jayasuriya (2012, 186) argue that the interests of Singapore’s domestic 
bourgeoisie are conditioned by and, hence, dependent on state capitalism. 
2 For a concerted debate on this issue, see the exchange between Yee and Lyons (2009). Yee 
argues that such NGO strategies are necessary given tight state controls on political 
expression while Lyons argues that these strategies reproduce dominant (state) discourses on 
gender, citizenship and civil society. Crucially, neither deeply explores the driving forces 
behind advocacy on behalf of migrant domestic workers. 
 
3 See Piper (2005) for a broad outline of the activities of these various groups and Lyons 
(2009, 97-103) for a more updated view of the activities of TWC2 and HOME. 
 
4 While their substantive focus is on migrant domestic workers and migrant non-domestic 
workers (such as those in the construction and shipbuilding industry) they have also taken up 
the concerns of asylum seekers, fishermen and victims of human trafficking. 
 
5 While NGO calls for COE were initially rejected by the Ministry – initial batches of under-
deployed workers were repatriated without benefits – the latter subsequently did make this 
exception. The gains of advocacy during the GFC are further elaborated on later in this 
section and in subsequent sections. 
 
6 The Ministry’s conditions were that the workers had a given period of time (less than a 
month) to source for their own jobs within their existing industry sector (such as construction 
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or shipbuilding) and that their potential employers had to be eligible to hire additional 
workers. 
 
